Authority. X.509. Certificate Hierarchy

Public-key cryptography has been recommended for use with the ISO authentication framework, also known as the X.509 protocols This framework provides for authentication across networks. Although no particular algorithms are specified for either security or authentication, the specification recommends RSA. There are provisions, however, for multiple algorithms and hash functions. X.509 was initially issued in 1988.


The most important part of X.509 is its structure for public-key certificates. Each user has a distinct name. A trusted Certification Authority (CA) assigns a unique name to each user and issues a signed certificate containing the name and the users public key.

The version field identifies the certificate format. The serial number is unique within the CA. The next field identifies the algorithm used to sign the certificate, together with any necessary parameters. Issuer is the name of the CA. The period of validity is a pair of dates; the certificate is valid during the time period between the two. Subject is the name of the user. The subjects public key information includes the algorithm name, any necessary parameters, and the public key. The last field is the CAs signature.

If Alice wants to communicate with Bob, she first gets his certificate from a database. Then she verifies its authenticity. If both share the same CA, this is easy. Alice simply verifies the CAs signature on Bobs certificate.

If they use different CAs, its more complicated. Think of a tree structure, with different CAs certifying other CAs and users. On the top is one master CA. Each CA has a certificate signed by the CA above it, and by the CAs below it. Alice uses these certificates to verify Bobs certificate.

Alices certificate is certified by CAA ; Bobs is certified by CAB. Alice knows CAAs public key. CAC has a certificate signed by CAA, so Alice can verify that. CAD has a certificate signed by CAC. CAB has a certificate signed by CAD. And Bobs certificate is signed by CAB. By moving up the certification tree to a common point, in this case CAD, and then down to Bob, Alice can verify Bobs certificate.

Certificates can be stored on databases around the network. Users can send them to each other. When a certificate expires, it should be removed from any public directories. The issuing CA, however, should maintain a copy of the certificate. Should a dispute arise later, it will be required

28 PGP. Key Management in PGP. PGPs Web of Trust. IDEA.Key Schedule.Standard ANSI X9.17. Working with PGP

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is a freeware electronic-mail security program, originally designed by Philip Zimmermann . It uses IDEA for data encryption, RSA (with keys up to 2047 bits) for key management and digital signatures, and MD5 as a one-way hash function.

PGPs random public keys use a probabilistic primality tester, and get their initial seeds from measuring the users keyboard latency while typing . PGP generates random IDEA keys using the method delineated in ANSI X9.17, Appendix C ,with IDEA as the symmetric algorithm instead of DES. PGP also encrypts the users private key using a hashed pass phrase instead of a password. PGP-encrypted messages have layered security. The only thing a cryptanalyst can learn about an encrypted message is who the recipient is, assuming he knows the recipients key ID. Only after the recipient decrypts the message does he learn who signed the message, if it is signed. Contrast this approach with PEM, which leaves quite a bit of information about the sender, recipient, and message in the unencrypted header.

The most interesting aspect of PGP is its distributed approach to key management.

There are no key certification authorities; PGP instead supports a web of trust. Every user generates and distributes his own public key. Users sign each others public keys, creating an interconnected community of PGP users.



29.Protocols. Digital Cash.Examples. Key management

A security protocol (cryptographic protocol or encryption protocol) is an abstract or concrete protocol that performs a security-related function and applies cryptographic methods.

A protocol describes how the algorithms should be used. A sufficiently detailed protocol includes details about data structures and representations, at which point it can be used to implement multiple, interoperable versions of a program.

Cryptographic protocols are widely used for secure application-level data transport. A cryptographic protocol usually incorporates at least some of these aspects:

Keyagreement orestablishment

Entity authentication

Symmetric encryption and message authentication material construction


Non-repudiation methods

Digital cash- A system that allows a person to pay for goods or services by transmitting a number from one computer to another. Like the serial numbers on real dollar bills, the digital cash numbers are unique. Each one is issued by a bank and represents a specified sum of real money. One of the key features of digital cash is that, like real cash, it is anonymous and reusable.

Key Management

Alice and Bob have a secure communications system. They play mental poker, simultaneously sign contracts, even exchange digital cash. Their protocols are secure. Their algorithms are top-notch. Unfortunately, they buy their keys from Eves Keys-R-Us, whose slogan is You can trust us: Security is the middle name of someone our ex-mother-in-laws travel agent met at the Kwik-EMart. Eve doesnt have to break the algorithms. She doesnt have to rely on subtle flaws in the protocols. She can use their keys to read all of Alices and Bobs message traffic without lifting a cryptanalytic finger. In the real world, key management is the hardest part of cryptography. Designing secure cryptographic algorithms and protocols isnt easy, but you can rely on a large body of academic research. Keeping the keys secret is much harder.

communications clerk in a diplomatic embassy can be a bargain. The Walkers sold U.S. Navy encryption keys to the Soviets for years. The CIAs director of counterintelligence went for less than $2 million, wife included. Thats far cheaper than building massive cracking machines and hiring brilliant cryptanalysts. Eve can steal the keys. She can arrest or abduct someone who knows the keys. She can seduce someone and get the keys that way

sdamzavas.net - 2020 . ! , ...